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Valérie Niquet
During two critical meetings, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to France 
in May 2019, followed by President Macron’s visit to Japan in June of 
the same year, several elements were highlighted that demonstrate 
a close convergence of analysis on the strategic situation in the 
Indo-Pacific region. This convergence paves the way for increased 
opportunities for cooperation. Internal evolutions on defense-related 
issues in Japan since 2012 have made this type of cooperation 
more accessible. On the French side, a more assertive ambition for 
engagement in a critical area has been expressed on many occasions. 
A convergence of ideas
France has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to essential 
principles, which also underpin Japan’s Defence and security policy. 
For Florence Parly, French Minister of Armed Forces, the evolution 
of the security order in the Indo-Pacific affects our interests directly.1 
These principles are the will to preserve stability, the principle of 
freedom of navigation, to respect the rule of law based on a universal 
value system that rejects the use of force, or coercion to change 
the status quo and to reject hegemony strategies of influence. For 
Paris as for Tokyo, the implementation of these principles relies on 
elements of military capability, and the French Minister of the Armed 
Forces confirmed that France must maintain a level of capabilities 
ready to face any threats in the region, including threats to the 
implementation of the freedom of navigation and insidious or grey 
zones risks. 
With regard to the perception of the strategic situation in the 
Indo-Pacific area, which makes particular sense for France, with 
1　Speech by Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Shangri La Dialogue 
June 2019.
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direct national interests in the Indian and the 
Pacific Ocean (the only European power in this 
case), and with a considerable presence of more 
than 1 million residents, 3 permanent bases, 5 
military commands and some 7000 pre-deployed 
personnel .  Beyond the major  economic 
challenges, which depend on the stability of 
the region and the security of maritime lines 
of communication, 93% of France’s EEZ, the 
second largest in the world, is located in this 
very area. 
The perceptions and analysis of the strategic 
situation in France and Japan are very similar. 
For Japan, the area is at the heart of its vital 
interests, which directly af fect the economic 
and strategic security of the archipelago. With 
regard to threat assessment, France’s 2017 
Defence Review, as well as the new edition of 
the Indo-Pacific Strategy, published in June 
2019, highlights, like Japanese documents, the 
risks associated with big power rivalries, fait-
accompli strategies, the threat to a free access to 
resources, particularly in the maritime space but 
also environmental and climate-related risks.2
For France, what is at stake goes beyond the 
economy and the prosperity of Europe but is a 
question of principles based on the respect of 
rules governing international relations.3 These 
rules apply to the respect of sovereignty with 
no inter ference, which is challenged in the 
maritime space of the Indo-Pacific. 
A common willingness to engage in the 
area
The willingness of France and Japan to 
engage in the area, and to cooperate, are two 
factors that play a significant role in deepening 
relations.
For France, the desire to diversify our 
strategy towards Asia is essential, initiated by 
2　La France et la sécurité en Indo-Pacifique, http://defense.gouv.fr, June 2019.
3　Speech by Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Shangri La Dialogue 2019.
President Hollande and confirmed by President 
Macron. This is an essential element of our 
strategy towards this region.
In concrete terms, France is already involved 
in many actions in the area with its regular 
participation in naval exercises, in particular 
with Japan, India, Australia, and the United 
States, the deployment of our navy in the 
China Sea several times a year, including with 
European obser vers but also, the ambition 
to strengthen our partnerships with regional 
maritime powers such as Australia, India, Japan, 
Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia 
and Vietnam.
Concerning information sharing, at the 
hear t of the concept of Maritime Domain 
Awareness, France has a liaison officer within 
the Information Fusion Center (IFC Changi and 
Madagascar) on sea lines of communication 
surveillance. It also plays a role with its liaison 
of ficers with HA/DR coordination centers 
in an area particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters. Here again, cooperation with Japan, 
whose excellence in this area is recognized, is a 
significant point.
In this respect, France is ready to strengthen 
its cooperation with regional organizations, 
w h e r e  i t  c a n  p l a y  a  m a j o r  r o l e  a s  a n 
intermediary, particularly with the EU, within 
organizations such as the ADMM+ format. This 
would also strengthen the par tnership with 
Japan. 
In the Pacific, France is part of the FRANZ 
format, which coordinates and rationalizes civil 
and military assistance to Pacific states and 
territories. In a period of uncertainty, when 
other powers are developing ambitions in the 
region, this is an essential element. In this sector 
in particular, in such a vast and vulnerable area, 
capacity development is essential, and both 
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Japan and France have a role to play.
In the same area, the North Pacific Coast 
Guard Forum, (2000), a Japanese initiative, 
and the Heads of Asia Coast Guards meetings 
initiated in 2004 offers other opportunities for 
positive cooperation.
At the same time, since 2012, Japan has 
adopted a new posture on security and defense 
which facilitates its commitment to a higher 
international contribution to peace, including 
in par tnership with new actors beyond the 
United States, even if Washington remains - 
and it cannot be otherwise - the core of Japan’s 
defense and security system.4
In 2013, Japan adopted a national security 
strategy for the first time since 1945. In 2014, the 
principles for transferring military equipment 
were made more flexible, making it possible, for 
example, to sign an ACSA (acquisition and co 
servicing agreement sharing of defense supplies 
and services) with France in July 2018. Not to 
mention the new defense laws, which came 
into force in 2016 and facilitate the participation 
of the Self dense forces in humanitarian aid, 
peacekeeping, and natural disaster response 
operations. All this also facilitates cooperation, 
including cooperation involving the self-defense 
forces, in capacity development. 
Converging concepts of security and 
stability
These evolutions led to greater convergence 
on concepts, but with differences that must be 
taken into account and understood. 
In Tokyo, two concepts dominate that 
of FOIP and that of QUAD (United States, 
Japan, India Australia) sometimes seen as an 
operational translation of the previous one.
4　Prime Minister Abe: «Japan must be a net contributor to the provision of the worldʼs welfare and security… Japan 
will proactively contribute for Peace and Stability of the region and the world.»
For its part, France adheres to the concept 
of a free and open Indo-Pacific with, however, 
a more inclusive vision, particularly towards 
ASEAN countries. 
Moreover, if China’s lack of transparency and 
assertiveness is taken into account in Paris, the 
pursuit of a strategy of lucid and constructive 
engagement is never rejected. Here again, there 
is an element of convergence with Japan, which, 
for its part, with the visit of Prime Minister 
Abe to China in 2018, and the invitation to the 
Chinese President for a state visit in 2020, favors 
the same willingness to normalize its relations 
with the PRC. 
Capacity development: an operational 
field of cooperation
France maintains a network of militar y 
cooperat ion and strategic  par tnerships 
throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including 
joint capacity development exercises, sharing 
of expertise, training of personnel, providing 
equipment in sectors related to information 
sharing, detection assistance, humanitarian 
assistance, and natural disaster response. All this 
is at the heart of our objective of stabilization in 
the area, an objective shared with Japan. 
Paris also wants to better coordinate all 
these actions, with all its partners which range 
from the Pacific to Africa and South-East Asia, 
whose centrality must not be forgotten. As far 
as Africa is concerned, this is a major challenge 
for France and Europe, including in terms of 
training, with, in particular, the Africa 2015 plan 
which, as in the Pacific, aims to offer African 
countries a positive alternative to China’s 
offensive.
For its par t, Japan has placed capacity 
development at the heart of its security and 
stabilization policy. In par ticular, with the 
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training of maritime personnel in Somalia and 
Djibouti, the provision of coastguard patrol 
boats and self-defense force training aircraft to 
countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, 
the training of military personnel specializing 
in underwater medicine, and very importantly, 
assistance in the development of seabed 
mapping, where France also has an area of 
excellence. 
In all these areas, synergies with France can 
and must be developed between two countries 
that share the same values and many interests. 
This cooperation applies to the countries of Asia 
and the Pacific, where the logic of cooperation 
is solid. However, East Africa and the Horn of 
Africa with the problems related to piracy is 
also a major region in the Indian Ocean. Japan's 
investment, with the TICAD conferences, 
the next of which will be held in Tokyo in 
August 2019, is an essential element of this 
complementary stabilization strategy. 
These synergies will also be translated 
into areas that also contribute to fostering 
dialogue and strengthening the strategic 
par tnership between our two countries, 
including the environment and climate change, 
which increases the vulnerability of sensitive 
areas such as the South China Sea, as well 
as territories in the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific. These challenges of fer a wide range 
of opportunities for cooperation and dialogue. 
Moreover, these oppor tunities and the role 
played by France in Europe, contribute to 
an increased awareness of security issues in 
the region, and the development of a more 
integrated approach and strategic vision among 
all the States of the European Union. 
